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Abstract 
If public funds are aHocated efficiently, then an increase in funding should improve the perfor-
mance of substance abuse treatment programs. In the data used in this paper, performance (measured 
as abstinence rates) and expenditures per patient are not positively correlated. One explanation is 
that funding is endogeneous, i.e. programs treating more difficult patients receive more funding. The 
data comes from aH Maine's outpatient drug-free prograrns that received public funding between 
1991 and 1994. After controlling for endogeneity, this paper concludes that the marginal impact of 
expenditures per patient on abstinence rates is small and statistically insignificantly different from 
zero. 
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1. Introduction 
Substance abuse treatment started receiving major funding from the US Federal Govern-
ment around 1965 duríng the opioid epidemic of the 1960s. Since then, state governments as 
well as prívate sources have also contríbuted to the financing of these prügrams. Estimates 
for 1985 1 say that 64% of the direct health costs from drug abuse was supported by state, 
federal, or local funds. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 the Federal Government 
increased its funding for substance abuse treatment substantially.2 Despite the growth in 
* Te!': +34-91-624-9571; fax: +34-91-624-9875. 
E-mail address:mmachado@eco.uc3m.es (M.P. Machado). 
1 See Rice et al. (1991). 
2 In the fiscal yeat 1990, for example, the Federal Government increased block grants for substance abuse 
treatment by 50%. 
2public funding, little is known about the cost-effectiveness of these programs. In this pa-
per, the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rate of substance abuse (mainly 
alcohol abuse) outpatient drug-free treatment programs in the state of Maine from 1991 to 
1994 is estimated. 
The main motivation for this paper comes from the puzzling observation that the un-
conditional correlation between performance of treatment programs and expenditures per 
patient is non-positive in our dataset. If this anecdotal evidence proves to be generally true, 
the state of Maine would be better off transferring funds from alcohol abuse treatment 3 to 
other social programs. 
A closer look at the allocation process of state and federal funds across providers of 
alcohol abuse treatment in Maine suggests that expenditures per patient are potentially en-
dogenous. Funds are allocated in a centralized fashion by the Maine Office of Substance 
Abuse (OSA). Moreover, OSA collects very detailed information on patients' characteristics 
and performance at the patient level for every treatment agency. The use of this information 
in OSA's allocation decision is the potential source of endogeneity and may explain the 
non-positive unconditional correlation between expenditures per patient and treatment out-
comes. For instance, if OSA allocates more funds per patient to those programs with more 
difficult patients, and we do not control for patient characteristics, then the estimated impact 
of funds on outcomes would be biased downwards. In this paper, instrumental variables (IV) 
are used to avoid this potential endogeneity bias. 
The literature on treatment effectiveness has presented evidence (although many studies 
suffer methodological flaws 4 ) that patients tend to do better after treatment. McLellan et al. 
(1997) in a review of effectiveness studies conclude that the "data reviewed (from controlled 
clinical trials or real-world settings) indicate that substance-abuse patients show major 
reduction in their alcohol and drug use following their treatment" as well as improvement in 
medical, psychological functioning, and other components of quality of life. From the point 
of view of a policy maker who has an interest in getting the most out of every dollar spent, 
effectiveness of alcohol abuse treatment is certainly a necessary condition for continuing 
public funding. Nevertheless, as McLellan et al. point out, their review "has also shown 
substantial variability in effectiveness of substance abuse treatment across different settings, 
modalities, and programs. Put simply, not all programs are effective". 
Even if treatment, in general, proves to be effective, there is still scope for waste in the 
way public funds are being used. Waste may be caused by abad allocation of public funds: 
programs that are not effective being funded, or effective programs being over-funded and 
spending the excess dollars in activities that do not contribute to the patients' recovery. 
Cost-effectiveness studies, relating funds and outcomes, are rare, and do not always use 
multivariate regression analysis. The effect of funds on the performance of substance abuse 
treatment has been typically linked to the debate surrounding the choice of a less expensive 
outpatient treatment versus a more expensive inpatient treatment (Long et al., 1998; Walsh 
et al., 1991; Longabaugh et al., 1983). This paper sets out to analyze exclusively outpatient 
3 From this point onwards the terminology "alcohol abuse" instead of "substance abuse" given that around 90% 
of our sample are alcohol abusers is adopted. 
4 Apsler and Harding (1991) illustrate methodological mistakes using as an example the well-known Drug Abuse 
Reporting Program (DARP) study by Sells and Simpson (1976). 
3treatment programs, and estimate the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on their 
abstinence rateo 
It is perhaps useful to draw sorne evidence of the relationship between performance and 
funding from other social programs. In particular, the earlier construction of standardized 
performance measures for students in the US has allowed a large number of such studies 
in the education field (Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek et al., 1994). Aggregate data show that 
spending per pupil has been growing steadily since 1890, while average student perfor-
mance has not increased and has actually worsened since 1967 (Hanushek et al., 1994). The 
study Equality oi Educational Opportunity (Coleman et al., 1966) conc1uded that student 
background was the major predictor of student performance whi1e expenditures per student 
as well as other schoo1 inputs had no measurable impact. Researchers have not yet reached 
a consensus regarding the effect of funds on performance due to differences in the degree 
of data aggregation (Summers and Wolfe, 1977; Hanushek et al., 1996), the measurement 
of teacher's quality (Ferguson, 1991; Hanushek, 1986), and the treatment of endogenous 
expenditures (Lang and Somanathan, 1997). Like public schools, non-profit providers of 
alcohol abuse treatment are heavily financed by the federal and state governments, and are 
given great discretion in the use of their funding. 
This paper' s main conclusion is that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient is 
economically small and statistically not different from zero. The most optimistic estimation 
implies that, on an average, it would cost US$ 615,801.80 to produce an extra abstinent 
patient in Maine. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the background of the study, 
Section 3 derives the estimation model, Section 4 describes the dataset, Section 5 shows 
the estimation results, Section 6 discusses the assumptions and caveats and finally, Section 
7 conc1udes. 
2. Maine's substance abuse treatment system 
In 1988 the state ofMaine spent US$ 7,304,928.00 on substance abuse treatment programs 
(mainly alcohol abuse) and this total has grown to US$ 10,085,716.00 by 1995. The size of 
these numbers and the fact that close to 1 % of the state' s population has received treatment 
from public programs has led the authorities to adopt two important measures to monitor the 
supply of treatment services. Firstly, in October 1989, the Maine Addiction and Treatment 
System (MATS) was introduced. Secondly, in fiscal year 1993, performance incentives were 
introduced in the contracts signed with treatment agencies. Both measures have received 
wide attention from state authorities throughout the USo 
MATS consists of the requirement for all agencies receiving any public funding to fill 
out a standard admission and discharge form for each person who is treated for substance 
abuse related problems and to submit these forms to the relevant authority (after July 1990, 
the Office of Substance Abuse (OSA)). These forms give detailed information about each 
treatment program at the patient level. 5 
5 See Commons el al. (1997) or Cornmons el al. (1994) for a descriplion. 
4In July 1991,6 OSA added performance standards to its contracts. Programs were sup-
posed to meet these standard s although no penalty existed in case of non-compliance. In the 
fiscal year 1993, however, OSA changed its contracts in an attempt to introduce incentives. 
These new contracts stated that "allocation of resources for the (next) contract year may 
be affected by agency performance in the previous year". 7 According to Commons and 
McGuire (1997), "to date, OSA has not found it possible to reward good performers by al-
lowing them to retain surplus funds, due to legislative reduction in appropriations occurring 
as a result of Maine' s current economic situation". Occasionally, however, good performers 
received OSA's recommendation for additional federal funding and poor performers were 
put on a fee-for-service ancI/or shorter contracts. These compensations and penalties were 
not explicitly stated in the contract and therefore we make the simplifying assumption that 
implicit incentives are non existent. 8 
OSA measured program performance in three categories: efficiency, effectiveness, 
and special populations. Efficiency was related to the degree of compliance in the pro-
vis ion of the amount of services contracted with OSA. Effectiveness and special popu-
lations were disaggregated into a set of specific indicators with their own standards and 
were measured for primary c1ients only.9 Effectiveness intended to measure the qual-
ity of the services provided. Its indicators were obtained from the comparison of dis-
charge and admission MATS data on every single patient and aggregated at the program-
quarter level. Outpatient treatment programs had to satisfy at least 8 out of 12 indica-
tors in order to perform on Effectiveness. The "percentage of abstinent patients 30 days 
prior to discharge" is one of these indicators which should reach at least 70%. 10 
Finally, special populations intended to control for patient selection by guaranteeing 
that certain groups in the society (e.g. the elderly) received a given share of 
treatment. 
Besides managing the data collection process, OSA was responsible for the allocation 
of state appropriations and federal block grants across non-profit substance abuse treat-
ment agencies. The allocation of funds before PBC followed a historical pattern (Commons 
et al., 1997) meaning that each year's allocation was based on the previous year's. Nev-
ertheless, there is no strong evidence that PBC changed the historical rules of funding 
allocation dramatically (Commons and McGuire, 1997). OSA's contract with the agen-
cies established the amount OSA was assigning and its distribution across different pro-
6 Beginning of fiscal year 1992. From now on aH references to a year mean fiscal year. 
7 This is called "performance-based contracting" (PBC). 
8 Commons et al. (1997) mn linear regressions of abstinence rates and a few covariates, among them a dummy 
variable lhat takes value O before PBC was first introduced and value l afterwards. The aulhors find a positive and 
significant impact of lhe PBC dummy although they recognize lhat the PBC effect cannot be distinguished from a 
shift in the trend. We have introduced time dummies as explanatory variables in our estimations and we concluded 
that, after controHing for a much wider and different vector of program and discharged patient characteristics 
(including fixed effects) and restricting ourselves to outpatient programs, the impact of time dummies on abstinence 
rates was not significantly different from zero. The results of these "informal tests" are not presented in this papero 
9 Clients are either primary clients or "patients" (the ones who need treatment) or co-dependents of primary 
clients. 
10 Notice that patients may be discharged either because they have completed treatment, or because they are 
referred to another treatment program, or even because they dropped out of treatmen!. 
5grams (e.g. detoxification, outpatient treatment, and residential treatment) within the same 
contract. 11 
The effort put into reforming the supply of alcohol abuse treatment shows the importance 
that the state of Maine attaches to these social programs, and the relevance of the question 
that this paper addresses, i.e. the impact of the marginal dollar on the performance of 
treatment programs. 
3. The estimation model 
We have in mind a model where the unit of analysis is the outpatient program i, i 
1, ... ,n. Every quarter t, program i provides treatment to Nit patients. At the end of the 
quarter, Dit (O :s Dit :s Nit) patients are discharged from treatment. We as sume that all the 
patients discharged from program i in quarter t have the same probability Pi t of performing 
successfully. We model Pit as a logistic function of expenditures per patient, Cit, program 
and average discharged patient characteristics represented by the vector <t' and managerial 
effort or c1inic specific productivity mi, as follows: 
exp(o- + aCa + Z;tf3 + ~mi) 
Plf = 1 + exp(o- + aC1t + Z;tf3 + ~ml) (1) 
In Eq. O) O- is a constant term, and the total expenditures per patient Cit - Cit! Nit == 
Xit/Nit + Oit/Nit come partly from aSA's contribution (Xit), and partly from third party 
donations (Oit). 
The assumption of a common probability of success for discharged patients implies 
that the total number of successes from program i in period t (fit) follows a binomial 
distribution with parameters (Pit, Dit). The range of values for fit E [O, Dit] is consistent 
with the frequency of zero successes and al! successes that we observe in the data. In 
short, we interpret Pit as a reduced form production function where the output (the realized 
number of abstinent discharges) follows a random process and funds are used optimally in 
the acquisition of inputs, such as qualified staff. 
From the consistent estimation of Eq. O) we derive an estimate of the marginal impact 
of funds per capita on performance, given by 
( O~it) = afJ¡¡O - {lit) E [0,0.25a] for a > O. OCit (2) 
In order to obtain consistent parameter estimates we must deal with the possibility of omitted 
variables that cause Cit to be endogenous. There are two good reasons to suspect that funding 
may be endogenous. First, funding decisions are made in a centralized fashion by a well 
informed decision maker, OSA. And second, as Figs. 1 and 2 show, 12 the unconditional 
correlation between expenditures per patient and abstinence rates is non-positive in the data. 
11 Interestingly the state does not support methadone maintenance programs despite their relative success (see 
Ball and Ross, 1991). Each program within the same contract is separately evaluated in terms of performance. 
12 In these pictures we use two alternative definitions of expenditures per patient defined later in the paper. 
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Fig. 1. Current expenditures per patient YS. abstinence rateo 
This somewhat surprising empirical evidence suggests that OSA may be using funding 
allocations to compensate agencies with hard-to-treat patients. If this is indeed OSA's 
policy, we expect to observe a positive impact of funding on performance once we control 
for funding endogeneity. 
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Fig. 2. Accumulated expenditures per patient YS. abstinence rateo 
7Eq. (1) can be estimated foHowing two approaches: a non-linear maximum likelihood 
estimation based on the binomial distribution 13 and a non-maximum likelihood estimation 
of a linear version of Eq. (1). 
A non-linear maximum likelihood estimation presents two problems. First, while the 
managerial effort mi is not observable to the econometrician, it is likely to be observed 
by OSA officials due to a long-term relationship with these agencies. OSA is likely to 
take mi into consideration when deciding on the aHocation to agency i, in which case Cit is 
correlated with mi and therefore, an endogenous variable. The omission of relevant variables 
correlated with Cit such as mi, would yield biased estimates of C/. Second, we might think 
that the problem of unobserved managerial effort mi is solved with the introduction of fixed 
effects in its place. The introduction of fixed effects in a non-linear model, however, causes 
inconsistent estimates. Consistency requires the number of observations per agency to grow 
to infinity. 14 Hence, fixed effects may eliminate the endogeneity bias at the expense of an 
estimation bias. 
A linear model has the advantage of both avoiding the inconsistency caused by the 
introduction of fixed effects and of dealing with any remaining endogeneity through the 
use of instrumental variables estimation. Before linearizing Eq. (1) replace the managerial 
effort variable mi by a fixed effect parameter ki to be estimated, and introduce an error term 
eit representing aH time-variant omitted variables. The probability of success now takes the 
form 
exp(¡'} + C/Cit + Z;J3 + ki + e¡¡) 
Pit= 1 + exp(¡'} + C/Cit + Z;tf3 + ki + eit) . (3) 
The linearization of Eq. (3) hinges on three basic steps: (1) the use of the equality Yit/dit= 
Pit + Uit, where Yit/dit is the realized success rate, and Uit is an error term with E(Uit) = O, 
(2) the inversion of the logistic function and (3) a first-order linear approximation around 
Uit = O. The resulting linear equation is the basic equation that we will estimate using 
quarterly data on abstinence rates per outpatient program, and is given by 
( 
Yitldit ) _, log = ¡'} + C/Cit + zit f3 + ki + r¡it, 1 - Yitldit (4) 
where r¡it is a heteroscedastic error term with the following properties: 
Uit 
r¡i¡ = eit + . (1 _ .)' PII PII 
E(r¡it) = O, (5) 
13 Assuming that observations are independent across programs and time, the likelihood function is 
n Q¡ 
L( f3 ¡J k Id - ') - [l[lCd;, Yi' (1 - . )di'-Yi' a, , , I ,y,c,z - Yi/Pi! p¡t , 
i=lt=1 
where e;;; = dit! / (Yit! (dit - Yit) !) is the combinatorial term of tbe realized number of discharges di t by the realized 
number of successes Yit. Maximum likelihood results, not shown in this paper, can be found in Machado (1997). 
14 Andersen (1973) and Neyman and Scott (1948) show inconsistency for tbe maximum likelihood logit estimator. 
Machado (1997, Chapter 7) derives a consistent estimator for the binomial distribution witb a logistic probability 
of success in the presence of fixed effects. The latter estimator, however, demands a lot of computer time and is 
bes! used for smaller datasets. 
  ,
82 Var(Uit) 2 + Pit(l - Pit) 2 1 
var(r¡¡t) = (JI) + 2 = (JI) -"----------=- = (JI) +-----
dit(Pit(l - Pit») dit(Pit(l - Pit))2 ditPit(l-Pit) 
(6) 
Lastly, we must point out that in spite of its advantages over the non-linear model, the linear 
model (4) is incompatible with O or 100% success rates (y¡t/dit = {O, l}). In our dataset, 
Yit/dit attains zero in 1.7% ofthe observations and it attains 1 in 10% ofthe observations. 15 
We apply the standard procedure of approximating the values of 1 with 0.999 and of O with 
0.001. 16 
Next, we motivate the possibility of endogenous funding with a simple model where a cen-
tral manager/planner allocates scarce resources to a given number of plants/agencies. The 
model shows that, under certain reasonable assumptions, a planner would optimally choose 
to compensate agencies with lower exogenous productivity by increasing their amount of 
funding. 
3.1. A simple model of optimal allocation and implied endogeneity 
Consider the problem of the optimal allocation of a fixed budget X by a central manager, 
across n plants. Assume the manager has complete information about the plants' character-
istics and the characteristics of the production stochastic process. 
Each plant i, i = 1, ... ,n is characterized by three parameters Ni, ePi, and ei all known 
to the manager. Plant i disposes of Ni homogeneous units of a quasi-fixed input from which 
it produces Di units of output. Ni is exogenously given at price zero. 17 ePi denotes the 
gross output-to-input ratio (ePi = D¡jN¡) which is plant specific. e¡ is a parameter that 
characterizes the probability that each of the Di units produced is of minimum quality in 
which case it is considered a success. The budget X is interpreted as a variable input to the 
production function, which is allocated by the central manager as a function of Ni, ePi, and e i . 
The only source of uncertainty in the model is the number of successes. An example of 
this production technology is a batch production process, such as silicon chips. The size 
of the batch is the gross output given by Di, from which a fraction will be defective at 
the end of the production process. Call the random variable Yi E [O, Di] the number of 
successes (net output) from plant i. We as sume that Yi follows a binomial distribution with 
parameters Pi and Di. Pi represents the probability of success and is a function of the input 
15 These percentages are 3.7 and 16%, respectively, for the unc1ean dataset, that is before we drop observations 
with omitted values for variables in the estimations. 
16 Cox (1970, p. 33) shows that 
We tried using this transformation but we do not report the results since the correlation between the adjustment 
terrn (2d¡ t ) -1 and the set of instrumental variables used, produces invalid results. 
17 The simplest interpretation for Ni is a natural resource which supply differs by location and cannot be varied in 
the short runo This source of heterogeneity across plants has an obvious parallel in the OSA' s optimizing problem 
with the number of paticnts at cach agency. 
=- - -'- - - --=-- ---;:-
[ ( 
Yi,jdit + (2dit)-I)] (Pi') 1 E log 1 - log 1 _ p,", = o(di7 ). I - Yit/di' + (2di') 
9ratio, Xi = X¡! Ni, and the efficiency parameter ei, 
Pi = f(Xi, ei). (7) 
The probability of success is non-decreasing in both X¡ and e i (Jx (Xi, ei) ~ 0, fe (X¡, e¡) ~ 
O), and is concave in X¡. This technology exhibits constant retums to scale on the two inputs 
X¡ and N¡. If X¡ and N¡ are doubled, then D¡ is also doubled, implying that E (Y¡) = p¡ D¡ 
also doubles. 
Finally, we as sume that the manager's optimization problem is to allocate the budget 
across plants so as to maximize the total expected net output in the firm, which can be 
formalized as 
n 
max ELY¡ 
{XI, ... ,Xn } ¡=1 
s.t. {L7=I X¡ = X, X¡ ~ 0, (x ) 
Y¡"-'B(p¡, D¡), p¡= f ~¡' e¡ =f(X¡, e¡), i = 1, ... ,n, 
(8) 
where X, n, f, N¡, e ¡, and D¡ for i = 1, ... ,n are all known to the central manager. Since 
Y¡ follows a binomial distribution, we rewrite the maximization problem as 
n 
max LD¡f(X¡, e¡) 
{XI"",xn }i=1 
n 
S.t. LXi = X, 
i=1 
X¡~O, i=l, ... ,n. (9) 
Denoting by A the shadow value of public funds, the first-order condition when Xi > ° is 
af(Xi, ei) af(Xi, ei) 
Di = A {} cfJ¡ = A. 
aXi aXi 
(10) 
ResuIt 1. Conditional on being positive, the optimal Xi, is a decreasing function of the 
efficiency parameter ei if a2 f(X¡, e¡)!(aXiae¡) < O. 
Proof. dx;! dei = - (Jxe!!xx) < 0, trivial application of Roy' s identity and second-order 
condition. 18 D 
Result 1 tells us that conditional on receiving positive funding (X¡ > O) and on the 
concavity of the probability of success with respect to Xi, more efficient plants will have a 
lower input ratio then their more inefficient counterparts if their marginal productivity of 
success is decreasing in the efficient parameter e i . 
18 The result that dx /de < o when fe > O, hinges on the assumption that he < O. The same conceptual result 
of lower resources (X¡) for those with the highest probability of success also holds if he > O and fe < o. We 
restrict the model to these two cases because the theoretical prediction matches what we observe in the data, i.e. 
a non-positive or even negative correlation between expenditures (or funds) per patient and success rates. To see 
this, suppose that the opposite is true (w.l.o.g. we analyze only one case), i.e. fe > O and he > O, tbis implies 
that dx/de = -(jxe/hx) > O and df!de¡ = fe + h(dx/de) = fe - h(jxe/hx) > O. This altemative model 
predicts that we should observe a positive correlation in the data between resources per capita (Xi) and success 
rates (j), which is not the case in our dataset. 
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We have shown, in a very simple context, that a well-informed planner will optimally use 
its information in its allocation decision. Machado (1997) extends this model and applies it 
to the OSA allocation problem assuming that OSA's objective is to maximize the number 
of abstinent discharged patients in the state. 
3.2. Instrumental variables 
Once we established the potential risk of a downward bias due to the endogeneity of 
Cit, we need to look for instrumental variables. Instrumental variables have to be correlated 
with Cit but not directly correlated with the residuals T]it in Eq. (4). 
The most natural set of instruments are time durnmies (year and seasonal durnmies 
Y1, Y2, Y3, Q2, Q3, Q4). These are naturally correlated with expenditures per patient be-
cause OSA makes its allocation decision annually. Furthermore, OSA pays the agencies 
on a quarterly basis and often makes adjustments to the amounts allocated in the form of 
amendments to the contracts. Contract amendments are usually the result of an unexpected 
increase or cut in its total budget. 19 Machado (1997) shows that an optimal allocation 
model produces time dummies as the natural set of instruments for Cit. 
This paper also considers the number of co-dependents per patient (CODEPS) as an 
instrumental variable candidate. CODEPS is likely to affect expenditures since it may 
increase costs related to case-management, e.g. the costs of setting up a schedule convenient 
to all members of the family, telephone calls, cancellations, etc. Our assumption is that ít 
will not be directly correlated with performance but it may affect time in treatment. We will 
see that our results show sorne evidence of the latter effect. 
The length of the contract with OSA (KYEAR) is also likely to be correlated wíth expen-
ditures per patient since shorter contracts are usually paid by OSA on a fee-for-service basis 
which forces programs to cut costs or increase the number of patients to be able to break even. 
Average medicaid funds per patient (MC) is a good candidate for an instrumental vari-
able because medicaid funds are matched with OSA funds allowing for more expensive 
programs. 
The presence of local representatives in polítical institutions at the state level may have 
an impact on the budget allocated to agencies within a particular region. Consequently, we 
created a dummy variable, LEG, which takes the value one if the agency is located in a city 
with a legislator or a representative in the Appropriations Committee. 
Finally, we considered two variables related to the racial mix of patients (BLACK, 
WHITE) as instruments for Cit. These characteristics are easily observable by OSA and 
are likely to affect its budgeting decisions. In fact, our results show that the racial mix 
variables are among the best instrumental variables. 
4. The data 
Our dataset is composed of 38 contracts between OSA and agencies of alcohol abuse 
treatment from fiscal year 1990 through 1994. We dropped fiscal year 1990 observations 
19 We do not believe tbat time dummies have an impact on the probability of success. As Footnote 8 indicates, 
time dummies were not significant as regressors in the probability equation. 
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from the estimations due to incompatibilities and missing values that occurred following 
a major change in the format of the individual patient admission and discharge forms 
(MATS) in Apri11990. Moreover, when MATS was introduced, programs were not forced 
to fill out admission forms for c1ients who were already in treatment, which could lead to 
sizable biases in fiscal year 1990 observations. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel due to 
disruption of contracts, the emergence of new providers, or simply due to missing values 
for certain variables. 
Each contract may offer several programs on the same or different modalities. 20 Our 
unit of analysis is the outpatient treatment program within a contract that an agency signs 
with OSA. 
The main data source is the MATS admission and discharge forms. These forms con-
tain detailed information about the patient' s alcohol/drug addiction, general demographics, 
involvement with the law, mental health, and social environment. Although information 
reported in the MATS forms is self-reported, they are filled out by a clinician, which we 
think increases the reliability of the data. 
The second data source is the contracts between OSA and each of the agencies. The 
typical contract states the budget for the contract year as well as the break -down of the total 
budget across programs. 
The third data source is the quarterly financial reports submitted to OSA by the agen-
cies for each of their contracts. These reports state income and expenditures up to the 
contract -quarter. 
Finally, we used the monthly consumer price index for the northeast region from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to deflate expenditures. 
4.1. Performance measures 
In our study, we use as the performance measure one of the effectiveness indicators 
considered by OSA - the percentage of discharged patients from a given program in a 
given quarter, that are 'abstinent 30 days prior to discharge'. On an average, 72% of the 
discharged patients were abstinent 1 month prior to their discharge (see Table 1). 
4.2. Measures of spending 
Quarterly financial reports show how much was received from OSA and other sources 
(income) and how much was spent (expenditures) on the contract as a whole, up to the 
date of the reporto 21 Although this information has the advantage of being quarterly, and 
of reflecting real and not budgeted amounts, it is aggregated at the contract level instead of 
20 Usually, when a contract offers two programs ofthe same modality, e.g. outpatient treatment, they differ either 
by site (rural versus urban) or type of patients ( adolescent, regular or elderly). In these cases we merged the data 
into a single observation. 
21 In the data, income and expenditures are highly correlated (correlation coefficient around 0.8). We decided to 
use expenditures rather than income because these are more representative of the actual investment in patients. 
AIso, according to OSA officials, income may be seasonal or lagged. Medicaid payments, for instance, are usually 
made l year after expenses are incurred. 
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Table 1 
Sample statistics for sample without fiscal year 1990 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max. Median 
Program characteristics 
Total number of c1ients measured for performance in terms of abstinence PERACLI 470 79.76 88.26 O 354 36.50 
Total number of c1ients TOTCLI 470 110.40 120.31 500 55.00 
Budgeted percentage of total contract income directed to outpatient PERCO 405 0.82 0.27 0.03 1.00 0.97 
Funds per patient (TEXPDF/PERACLI) CPDS 334 891.9 1727.8 0.0 16229.7 437.1 
Funds per patient taking average time in treatment into account CUMCPDS 310 1537.8 5175.4 16.0 53206.8 490.0 
Funds per patient (TEXPDF/PERACLI) taking outliers out CPDS 322 755.0 1061.1 5.9 8173.3 436.6 
Dummy for fiscal year 1991 Y¡ 488 0.25 0.43 O 1 O 
Dummy for fiscal year 1992 Y2 488 0.26 0.44 O O 
Dummy for fiscal year 1993 Y3 488 0.25 0.43 O O 
Dummy for fiscal year 1994 Y4 488 0.24 0.42 O O 
Characteristics of the primary clients discharged 
Number of discharges measure for abstinence ABCLI 422 38.50 42.25 1 201 19.00 
Fraction of discharges that are abstinent ABMET 422 0.72 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.75 
Average time in treatment for discharges rneasured for abstinence ABTIM 422 125.49 87.59 1.00 723 108.19 
Fraction of discharges that dropped out DROPOUT 422 0.42 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.43 
Fraction of discharges that complete treatment COMPLETE 422 0.39 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.38 
Fraction of discharges that are white WHITE 422 0.95 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Fraction of discharges that are black BLACK 422 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.00 
Fraction of discharges that are homeless HOMELESS 422 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Fraction of discharges that depend on others for living DEPENDNT 422 0.19 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.13 
Fraction of discharges that are independent INDEPDNT 422 0.79 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.87 
Fraction of discharges tha! are in jail JAlLED 422 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Fraction of discharges that are in parole PAROLE 422 0.23 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.19 
Fraction of discharges that are waiting trial TRIAL 422 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.67 0.05 
Fraction of discharges that are veterans of war VET 422 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.13 
Fraction of discharges that have psychiatric problems PSYCH 422 0.11 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.07 
Fraction of discharges that have less than the 12th grade LESS12 422 0.41 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.36 
Fraction of discharges that have between the 12th and 16th grade BETW1216 422 0.58 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.62 
Fraction of discharges that have more than 16th grade MORE16 422 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Fraction of discharges that had at least five prior treatment episodes PRITX5 422 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.67 0.02 
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Discharges average age of first use of primary drug DRGAGE1 403 15.04 2.14 9.00 27.80 15.07 
Fraction of discharges with minor problems with spouse LOWSO 404 0.79 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.85 
Fraction of discharges with minor problems with family LOWFAM 404 0.85 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.91 
Fraction of discharges with minor problems at job/school LOWJOB 404 0.90 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.95 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is alcohol DlALCO 437 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.86 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is marijuana DlMARI 437 0.11 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.08 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is cocaine D1COCA 437 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is tranquilizers D1TRAN 437 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is barbiturants DlBARB 437 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is methamphetamine DlMETH 437 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is LSD DlLSD 437 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is heroin DlHERO 437 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose main drug at admission is other DlOTHR 437 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.50 0.00 
Fraction of discharges whose second drug at admission is alcohol D2ALCO 437 0.10 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.07 
Fraction of discharges whose second drug at admission is marijuana D2MARI 437 0.28 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.25 
Fraction of discharges whose second drug al admission is melhamphetamine D2METH 437 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Fraction of discharges with no use of main drug 1 month prior admission F1NULM 437 0.47 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Fraction of discharges using main drug once a month prior admission FlONEM 437 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.67 0.03 
Fraction of discharges using main drug two to three times a month prior admission F123M 437 0.07 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.05 
Fraction of discharges using main drug once a week prior admission FlONEW 437 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.04 
Fraction of discharges using main drug two to three limes a week prior admission F123W 437 0.11 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.08 
Fraction of discharges using main drug four to six times a week prior admission F146W 437 0.06 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.03 
Fraction of discharges using main drug once a day prior admission FlONED 437 0.08 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.04 
Fraction of discharges using main drug two lo three times a day prior admission F123D 437 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.67 0.00 
Fraclion of discharges using main drug more than three times a day prior admission F130VD 437 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.75 0.01 
Fraction of discharges classified as casual users at admission SEVCAS 417 0.08 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.03 
Fraction of discharges classified as involved users at admission SEVINV 417 0.21 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.18 
Fraction of discharges classified as dependent users at admission SEVDEP 417 0.36 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.34 
Fraction of discharges classified as dysfunctional users at admission SEVDYS 417 0.20 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Fraction of discharges with undetermined severity at admission SEVUDE 417 0.15 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.09 
Fraction of discharges that never had IV drug use IVNEVE 437 0.91 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.94 
Discharges average weekly household income, defiated HHINCD 391 597.94 361.76 0.00 5296.85 561.46 
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being disaggregated by programo This means that if a contract offers more than one program, 
we cannot disentangle the income received or expenditures made by each of them. To mea-
sure the expenditures made by outpatient programs, we assume that they are in accordance 
with the percentages stated on the contracts. 
We use two altemative measures of expenditures per patient: current expenditures per 
patient defined by the quarterly expenditure on an outpatient program divided by the total 
number of patients who received treatment during that quarter and accumulated expenditures 
per patient, which is computed as the sum of the current expenditures per patient over 
the average time the discharged patients were in treatment. The formula for accumulated 
expenditures per patient is 
Cit ~ { { AT }} Cit-s Cit=-. +L....,¿max min --s,s ,0 -.-, 
Nzt 90 Nzt- s 
s=1 
(11) 
where AT stands for average time in treatment of the discharged cohort. The correction for 
AT may be important since, as can be seen in Table 1, the average time in treatment (AT) is 
125.49 days and the median is 108.19 days, which is bigger than one quarter. 
More than 80% of the programs spend less than US$ 1000.00 per patient under both 
definitions of expenditures. For current expenditures per patient, we left out of the estimation 
observations where expenditures per patient were aboye US$ 11,000.00 or zero. The outliers 
belonged to two small programs in the dataset. We deleted the whole year of data for the 
outlier programo 
4.3. Patient characteristics data 
In our cstimation, we control for discharged patients characteristics, most of which were 
measured at the time of the patients' admission to the programo These data are taken from the 
MATS forms and aggregated at the program level. Some of these variables may be c1assified 
as frequency of use of primary drug, severity of alcohol abuse problem, type of primary 
and secondary drug, marital status, professional status, intravenous drug user, etc. Most of 
the variables have values between [O, 1] because they represent the fraction of discharged 
patients who fall into a particular category. Other variables tell us an average value; for 
example, the variable HHINC tells us the average household income of the discharged 
population at the time of their admission. Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for 
relevant variables. 
5. Results 
5.1. The first-stage estimation 
Tables 2 and 3 show the OLS estimation results of the first-stage regression for current 
and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively, with and without fixed effects. The 
tables only show the estimated coefficients of the sets of instrumental variables used in 
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Table 2 
First-stage regression oí current expenditure per patient using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM) and contract variables (CV) as instrumentsa 
Description Variable TD TD+DM TD+ DM+ CV 
WFEb WTFEc WFEb WTFEc WFEb WTFEc 
ECd t-stal.e ECd t-staLe ECd t-staLe ECd t-stat.e ECd t-staLC ECd t-staL C 
Intercept e 4700.93 3.16 719.01 0.35 4700.93 3.16 719.01 0.35 4479.08 3.25 2284.78 1.22 
Fiscal year 1991 Y¡ 287.48 3.58 171.70 1.47 287.48 3.58 171.70 1.47 535.37 5.40 327.48 2.38 
Fiscal year 1992 Y2 167.93 2.18 193.54 1.66 167.93 2.18 193.54 1.66 409.77 4.01 279.91 1.91 
Fiscal year 1993 Y3 93.00 1.28 56.17 0.54 93.00 1.28 56.17 0.54 257.90 3.32 112.82 1.02 
Second quarter Q2 76.16 1.08 -1.55 -0.01 76.16 1.08 -1.55 -0.01 68.26 1.07 12.52 0.12 
Third quarter Q3 -84.33 -1.28 -64.94 -0.62 -84.33 -1.28 -64.94 -0.62 -91.92 -1.54 -64.03 -0.67 
Forth quarter Q4 -45.69 -0.64 -41.88 -0.36 -45.69 -0.64 -41.88 -0.36 -33.27 -0.51 -32.45 -0.31 
Percentage oí white patients WHITE -1387.65 -1.90 -8.93 -0.02 -1730.52 -2.59 -221.56 -0.48 
Percentage oí black patients BLACK -666.59 -0.53 87.04 0.06 -1292.02 -1.13 654.66 0.48 
Contract length in years KYEAR 17.65 4.35 12.99 2.37 
Average number oí CODEPS 848.99 5.75 802.98 6.56 
co-dependents per patient 
Legislator or representative in LEG -258.60 -1.32 -38.21 -0.18 
Appropriations Committee 
Goodness-oí-fit 
Number oí observations 288 288 288 288 287 287 
R2 0.88 0.64 0.88 0.64 0.91 0.71 
Adjusted-R2 0.83 0.55 0.83 0.55 0.86 0.63 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 17.39 6.93 17.39 6.93 20.91 8.93 
Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value 
F-test (joint significancy 2.753 0.014 0.653 0.688 2.336 0.020 0.494 0.860 4.700 0.000 4.225 0.000 
oí a11 "instruments") 
a Regressions contain the fo11owing variables: D1ALCO, D1MARI, D1METH, D1HERO, D1LSD, DlBARB, DlTRAN, F146W, FlONED, F123D, F130VD, 
FlONEM, F123M, FlONEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, D2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PAROLE, TRIAL, 
VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW1216, HHINCD, PRlTX5, DRGAGEl, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlDMARI, FIDTRAN, 
F11ALCO, F1IHERO, F11MARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlDALCO, FlOTRAN, F11COCA and F11LSD. 
b With fixed effects. 
C Without fixed effects. 
d Estimated coefficient. 
e t-statistic. 
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Table 3 
First-stage regression of accumulated expenditure per patient using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM), contract variables (CV) and county variables (CYV) as 
instrumentsa 
Description Variable TD TD+DM DM 
WFEb WTFEc WFEb WTFEc WFEb WTFEc 
ECd t-stat! ECd t-staLe ECd t-staLe ECd t-stat.e ECd t-staLe ECd t-stat! 
Intercept e 8040.63 2.86 475.27 0.15 8040.63 2.86 475.27 0.15 8811.71 3.20 862.05 0.28 
Fiscal year 1991 Y¡ 264.21 1.77 -89.52 -0.50 264.21 1.77 -89.52 -0.50 
Fiscal year 1992 Yz 31.84 0.23 -14.99 -0.09 31.84 0.23 -14.99 -0.09 
Fiscal year 1993 Y3 -8.62 -0.07 -8.57 -0.05 -8.62 -0.07 -8.57 -0.05 
Seeond quarter Qz -175.98 -1.38 -191.67 -1.14 -175.98 -1.38 -191.67 -1.14 
Third quarter Q3 -202.90 -1.63 -110.87 -0.68 -202.90 -1.63 -110.87 -0.68 
Forth quarter Q4 -87.76 -0.66 14.88 0.09 -87.76 -0.66 14.88 0.09 
Percentage of white patients WHITE -6539.76 -4.69 -1872.60 -2.36 -6120.61 -4.46 -1788.60 -2.31 
Percentage of black patients BLACK -6623.87 -2.84 12.45 0.01 -5835.37 -2.52 213.89 0.09 
Goodness-of-fit 
Number of observations 277 277 277 277 277 277 
RZ 0.78 0.53 0.78 0.53 0.77 0.53 
Adjusted-Rz 0.68 0.41 0.68 0.41 0.68 0.42 
F-statistie (zero slopes) 7.81 4.21 7.81 4.21 8.28 0.91 
Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value 
F-test (joint significancy 1.094 0.368 0.42 0.865 2.930 0.004 1.033 0.412 9.018 0.000 2.985 0.053 
of all "instruments") 
Intercept e 7943.35 2.86 1937.33 0.63 7943.35 2.86 1937.33 0.63 8864.19 3.22 1917.78 0.63 
Pereentage of white patients WHlTE -6088.27 -4.45 -2088.40 -2.67 -6061.75 -4.41 -2075.95 -2.67 
Percentage of blaek patients BLACK -3725.37 -1.44 2538.81 0.86 -5700.71 -2.46 314.19 0.14 
Contraet length in years KYEAR 8.11 1.57 13.61 2.16 8.11 1.57 13.61 2.16 5.25 1.07 12.98 2.15 
Medicaid funds per patient MC -0.24 -1.75 -0.17 -1.27 -0.24 -1.75 -0.17 -1.27 
Legislator or representative in LEG -614.70 -1.56 -25.61 -0.08 -614.70 -1.56 -25.61 -0.08 
Appropriations Committee 
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Goodness-of-fit 
Number of observations 
R2 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 
275 
0.78 
0.68 
8.13 
Test P-value 
275 275 
0.54 0.78 
0.42 0.68 
4.59 8.13 
Test P-value Test 
275 277 277 
0.54 0.77 0.54 
0.42 0.68 0.43 
4.59 8.19 4.78 
P-value Test P-value Test P-value Test P-value 
F-test (joint significancy 2.166 0.093 1.980 0.118 4.681 0.000 2.331 0.043 6.323 0.000 3.446 0.018 
of all "instruments") 
a Regressions contain the following variables: D1ALCO, D1MARI, D1METH, D1HERO, D1LSD, DlBARB, DlTRAN, F146W, F10NED, F123D, F130VD, 
FlONEM, F123M, F10NEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, ssD2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PAROLE, TRIAL, 
VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW1216, HHINCD, PRITX5, DRGAGE1, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlDMARI, FlDTRAN, 
F11ALCO, F11HERO, F11MARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlDALCO, FlOTRAN, F11COCA and F11LSD. 
b With fixed effects. 
e Without fixed effects. 
d Estimated coefficient. 
e f-statistic. 
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the "production function" estimation. The tables also show goodness-of-fit statistics and an 
F-test of the joint significancy of the instruments used. 
Our baseline model is the estimation with fixed effects for which our instruments perform 
better as first-stage regressors, as we can see from the comparison of the P-values of the 
F-test, at the bottom of the tables. 
For current expenditures per patient most candidates for instrumental variables are good 
first-stage regressors. The lowest P-value of the F-test (in Table 2) is obtained with the 
largest number of instruments. 
For accumulated expenditures per patient we had more difficulty in finding good instru-
ments. In general, the time dummies, KYEAR and CODEPS are not good predictors of 
accumulated expenditures per patient while the variables WHITE, BLACK, MC and LEO 
perform quite well. 
WHITE and BLACK have a negative impact in both current and accumulated expendi-
tures per patient. This probably reflects the negative correlation with the number of American 
Indians, which are concentrated in areas such as Indian reservations that may require more 
expensive programs. 
The length of the contract with OSA (KYEAR) has a significant positive impact on both 
current and accumulated spending per patient probably because short-term contracts force 
programs to be more cost-conscious. 
CODEPS also affects positively and very significantly the current spending per patient 
although it had no significant impact on accumulated spending per patient. We suspect this 
difference has to do with two distinct effects that offset each other, causing CODEPS not 
to be correlated with accumulated expenditures per patient. First, conditional on time in 
treatment, family therapy sessions involve costs that increase both current and accumulated 
spending. Second, it is likely that family therapy affects the patient's time in treatment and 
therefore the accumulated spending. For example, patients may succeed faster (decreasing 
the average time in treatment), and sorne of the failures may drop out later (increasing 
the average time in treatment). We think the net effect on the average time in treatment is 
negative offsetting the increase in costs per periodo 
Average medicaid funds per patient (MC) had no significant effect on current expenditures 
per patient and an almost significantly negative impact on accumulated expenditures per 
patient contrary to our belief. It is possible that medicaid selects providers on the basis of 
cost. 
Surprisingly, LEO has a negative impact on both current and accumulated expenditures 
per patient probably because we are also controlling for another poli tic al variable, the city' s 
representation in the Human Resources Committee (JSTANDCR). JSTANDCR is not used 
as an instrument because it is also correlated with performance. 
5.2. The instrumental variable estimation ofthe "productionfunction" 
This subsection describes the results of the "production function" estimation. Tables 4 
and 5 show the estimated C( and intercept term for the IV and OLS estimation for current 
and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively. These tables also provide mea-
sures of goodness-of-fit and tests of endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions. The 
IV estimates reported are obtained from the standard IV estimator S = (X'Z(Z'Z)-l 
19
Table 4 
"Production function" estimation using current expenditures per patient and also using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM) and contract variables (CV) as instrumentsa 
Description Variable OLS results (RS.D.b ) IV estimation results (R.S.D.b ) 
ID TD+DM TD+DM+CV 
WFEc WTFEd WFEc WTFEd WFEc wrFEd WFEc WTFEd 
EC< t-slaL f EC< t-stat. f EC' t-slaL f EC' t_slaLf EC< t-stat. f EC< t-stat. f EC< t-stat.f EC' t-slaL f 
Intercept e -4.766 -0.934 -6.432 -1.111 -4.121 -0.612 -7.271 -1.285 -4.093 -0.674 -10.0..<;2 -1.825 -4.905 -1.011 -8.521 -1.592 
Expenditures per palien! ePDS -0.0002 -0.591 -O,eX)()2 -0.616 -0.0004 -0.415 0.0004 0.249 -O.cX)()4 -0.418 0.0006 0.377 -0.0002 -0.370 -0.0007 -1.880 
List of mstruments 
Fiscal yeal 1991 Y¡ Y¡ Y¡ Y¡ 
Fiscal yeal 1992 Y2 Y2 Y2 Y2 
Fiscal year 1993 Y3 Y3 Y3 Y3 
Second quarter Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 
Third quarter Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 
Fourth quarter Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 
Percentage of white WHITE WHITE WHITE 
patients 
Percentage ofblack BLACK BLACK BLACK 
patients 
Average number of CODEPS CODEPS 
co-dependents per 
palient 
Contraet length in years KYEAR KYEAR 
Legislatoror lEG lEG 
representative on 
the Appropriations 
Committee 
Goodness-of-fit 
Number of observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 287 287 
R2 0.70 0.49 0.70 0.47 0.70 0.44 0.70 0.46 
Adjusted_R2 0.58 0.37 0.57 0.34 0.58 0.32 0.58 0.34 
F-slatistie (zero slopes) 5.95 4.11 5.73 3.76 5.93 3.55 5.91 3.84 
Mroz version of Hausman test - all coefficients 
Value of the test 0.057 0.291 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.08 
(IVagainst 
OLS estimation) 
P-value (Chi-square 81 d.f.) 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Description Variable OLS results (R.S.D.b ) 
Testing the overidentifying restrictions 
Sargan test 
P-value 
F-testoffirst-stage 
estimation and d.f. 
P-value of F-test 
offirst-stage 
estimation 
IV estimatian results (R.S.D,b) 
TD 
8.933 
0.112 
2.753 (6,200) 
0.014 
5.341 
0.376 
0.653 (6.228) 
0.688 
TD+ DM TD+DM+CV 
WFEc WTFEd WFEc WTFEd 
8.934 12.413 13.241 17.561 
0.257 0.088 0.278 0.092 
2.336 (8,200) 0.494 (8,228) 4.700 (11,196) 4.225 (11,224) 
0.020 0.860 0.000 0.000 
a Regressions contain the following variables: DIALCO, DIMARI, DIMETH, DIHERO, DILSD, DlBARB, DlTRAN, F146W, FIONED, F123D, F130VD, 
FlONEM, F123M, FlONEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, D2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PARO LE, TRIAL, 
VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW1216, HHINCD, PRITX5, DRGAGEl, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlDMARI, FlDTRAN, 
FllALCO, FllHERO, FllMARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlDALCO, FlOTRAN, FllCOCA and FllLSD. 
b Robust standard deviation. 
e With fixed effects. 
d Without fixed effects. 
e Estimated coefficient. 
f t-statistic. 
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Table 5 
"Production function" estimation using accumulated expenditures per patient and also using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM), contract variables (CV) and county 
variables (CY V) as instrumentsa 
Des.cription Variable OLS results (R.S.D.b) 
WFEC WTFEd 
EC~ t-stat. f Ec" t-stal. f 
Intcrcept -1.913 -0.320 -2.484 -0.439 
Expenditures per palien! erDS 0.0000 0.257 0.0003 2.217 
Lisl of instrumcnts 
Fiscal year 1991 Y1 
Fiscal year 1992 Y2 
Fiscal year 1993 Y3 
Second quarter Q2 
Third quarter Q3 
Forthquarter Q4 
Percentage of whitc patients WHITE 
Percentagc of bJack patients BLACK 
Number of observations 277 277 
R2 0.68 0.53 
Adjusted_R2 0.55 0.42 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 5.13 4.69 
Mroz endogeneity test 
(IV against OLS estimation) 
P-value (Chi-square 82 d.f.) 
Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions 
P-value 
F-testoffirst-stage 
estimation and dJ 
P -value of F -test of 
first-stage estimation 
IV estimation results (R.S.D.b) 
TD 
WFEc WTFEd 
El~ t-stat.f Ec" 
-4.010 -0.5]5 -1.957 
0.0003 0.396 -0.0003 
YI 
Y2 
Y3 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
277 277 
0.68 0.47 
0.54 0.34 
5.03 3.64 
0.000 0.014 
1.000 1.000 
10.871 7.319 
0.054 0.198 
1.094 (6,190) 0.420 (6,217) 
0.368 0.865 
TD+DM 
t-staL f Ece 
-0.331 -3.699 
-0.355 0.0002 
277 
0.68 
0.55 
5.24 
0.000 
1.000 
10.944 
0.141 
2.930 (8,190) 
0.004 
t-staC f 
-0.772 
0.570 
YI 
Y2 
Y3 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
WHITE 
BLACK 
WfFEd 
Ec" t-stat,f 
-2.999 -0.613 
0.0003 0.553 
277 
0.53 
0.42 
4.90 
0.000 
1.000 
11.176 
0.131 
1.033 (8.217) 
0.412 
 
t
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Table 5 (Continueá) 
Description 
Intercept 
Expenditures per patien! 
List of instruments 
Percentage of white patients 
Percentage of black patients 
Contraet length in years 
Legislator Or representative in 
Appropriations Committee 
Medicaid funds per patien! 
Number oi observations 
R2 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic (zero slopes) 
Mroz endogeneity test 
(IV against OLS estimation) 
P-value (Chl-square 82d.f.) 
Sargan test oi Ihe 
overidentifying restrictions 
P-value 
F-testoifirst-stage 
estimation and d.f. 
P-value oi F-test of 
first-stage estimation 
Variable 
e 
epos 
WHITE 
BlACK 
KYEAR 
LEG 
MC 
DM 
WFEC 
Ee" 
-3.647 
O.{)(X)2 
277 
0.68 
0.55 
5.25 
0.000 
1.000 
0.351 
0.553 
9.018 (2,196) 
0.000 
CV+DM+CYV 
WTFEd WFEC 
t_sta!.f Ee" (_stat. f EC' 
-0.756 -2.734 -0.565 -2.818 
0.487 0.0005 0.953 -0.0001 
WHITE 
BLACK 
277 275 
0.52 0.68 
0.41 0.55 
4.69 5.23 
0.002 OJXH 
1.000 1.000 
0.808 7.481 
0.369 0.113 
2.985 (2,223) 4.681 (5,191) 
0.053 0.000 
CV+DM 
WTFEd WFEC WTFEd 
t-slaL f Ee" t-slaL f Ee" t-staLf Ee" t-stat. f 
-0.587 -3.094 -0.633 -3.508 -0.742 -2.835 -0.584 
-0.205 0.0003 0.813 0.0002 0.408 0.0004 0.945 
WHITE WHITE 
BLACK BLACK 
KYEAR KYEAR 
LEG 
MC 
275 277 277 
0.53 0.68 0.53 
0.42 0.55 0.42 
4.86 5.28 4.82 
0.000 0.000 0.001 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
1.661 0.871 0.862 
0.798 0.647 0.650 
2.331 (5,218) 6.323 (3,195) 3.446 (3,222) 
0.043 0.000 0.018 
a Regressions contain the following variables: D1ALCO, D1MARI, D1METH, D1HERO, D1LSD, DlBARB, D1TRAN, F146W, F10NED, F123D, F130VD, 
FlONEM, F123M, F10NEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, D2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PAROLE, TRIAL, 
VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW12l6, HHINCD, PRITX5, DRGAGE1, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlOMARI, FlOTRAN, 
FllALCO, FllHERO, FUMARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlOALCO, FlOTRAN, FllCOCA and FllLSD. 
b Robust standard deviation. 
e With fixed effects. 
d Without fixed effects. 
e Estimated coefficient. 
f t-statistic. 
ta
!
l
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Z' X)-l X' Z(Z'Z)-l Zly, where Z denotes the matrix of instruments and X the matrix of 
regressors. 22 
In our empirical model, the standard Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is not suitable for 
testing the endogeneity of expenditures per patient because of the inexistence of an efficient 
and consistent estimator under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. On the one hand, the 
maximum likelihood estimates are not consistent due to the presence of fixed effects. On 
the other hand, fe asible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates are not efficient (see 
Greene, 1993, p. 365) because the covariance matrix of the residuals depends on parameters 
that also explain the probability of success (see Eg. (6». Mroz (1987) devised an endogeneity 
test that does not reguire efficiency under the null. We computed the Mroz endogeneity test 
based on the distance between a consistent estimator under the null (the OLS estimator) 
and a consistent estimator under the altemative (the IV estimator). 
To test the overidentifying restrictions we have used the Sargan specification test based 
on the correlation between instruments and residuals. 23 
Table 4 shows a negative, although not significantly different from zero, marginal impact 
of current expenditures per patient on performance for the baseline model with fixed effects. 
The Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at the 10% confidence level, 
and the instruments are strongly correlated with current expenditures per patient as the 10w 
P-values of the F-test indicate. AH sets of instruments used are good instruments, although 
the most solid Sargan and F-tests are obtained when aH instruments are used simultaneously. 
The Mroz endogeneity test does not reject the nuH hypothesis of exogeneity of current 
expenditures per patient. The exogeneity of funding is probably related to the rich set of 
regressors already included in the estimations, in particular the fixed effects. When fixed 
effects are not inc1uded in the estimations, we see that the fit of the regressions drops 
considerably and the instruments are not valido The estimates of the model without fixed 
effects are, therefore, shown for purposes of comparison only. We conc1ude that the impact 
of current expenditures per patient on performance is small and non-positive. 
For accumulated expenditures per patient, Table 5 shows much more optimistic estimates. 
For the most part, the coefficient on accumulated expenditures per patient is now positive, 
although not significantly different from zero, and quantitatively small. The sets of valid 
22 Although this paper does not report the results, we have also tried taking into account the heteroscedasticity of 
the error tenu by estimating the residual covariance matrix Q. Assuming Q to be a diagonal matrix, the estimation 
of the variance terms was based on the litted values from the foJlowing regression: 
,2 2 1 
IJit = ag + X d. '. (1 _ '.) + ~it. 
IlPU Pa 
Once we estimate ti = diag{~} we can derive the IV-OLS analogue and IV-GLS analogue (see Bowden 
and Turkington, 1984). However, the estimated standard deviations of both the IV-OLS analogue and IV-GLS 
analogue were very large due to the low lit of the i¡f, regression which R2 was never aboye 0.01. This result may 
be due to omitted variables, or heteroscedasticity in the other component of the error tenu Bit. 
23 The Sargan test takes the fonu 
where s is the difference between the number of instruments and the number of parameters to estimate. 
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instruments are now different from the sets used for current expenditures per patient. In 
particular, time dummies are no longer strongly correlated with uccumuluted expenditures 
per patient and do not show a good Sargan test, as can be seen in the second column ofTable 5. 
WHITE and BLACK, on the other hand, perform very well as instrumental variables. The 
only case where the baseline model with fixed effects shows a negative coefficient on Cit 
is when the P-value on the Sargan test is as low as 0.113, and therefore, the instruments 
are somewhat more correlated with the residuals than in other cases. In all the cases, the 
Mroz endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the accumulated 
expenditures per patient. 
Overall, the instrumental variable approach was unable to find a positive significantIy 
different from zero relationship between current or accumulated expenditures per patient 
and performance measured in terms of fraction of abstinent discharges. 
6. Discussion 
This section discusses policy implications, caveats, options and assumptions made in this 
paper that we think are relevant when interpreting results. 
An important limitation of this study is the restriction to a single performance measure. 
The traditional performance measures, based on substance consumption such as abstinence 
or simply reduction in consumption levels, are widely accepted as necessary for a good 
evaluation of a patient's performance. 24 More recentIy, other measures of performance 
such as reduction in criminal activities, general health, and behavior at work or school have 
become popular among researchers and health practitioners (McLellan et al., 1997). In the 
case of a1coholics, however, abstinence as a measure of performance is a good choice since 
a transition to moderate drinking is usually difficult to sustain. However, it is quite fe asible 
that marginal dollars may have a significant positive effect in attaining other treatment goals. 
Another limitation of this study is its forced reliance on performance data collected at 
the time of discharge from treatment, due to the inexistence offollow-up data. This will not 
be a source of bias if the correlation between performance at discharge and at follow-up 
is independent of expenditures per patient. Yet, it is reasonable to think that programs 
that invest more in their patients also have a stronger correlation between performance at 
discharge and at follow-up. This is c1early a problem that we can only hope is unimportant 
in this particular dataset. 
Next, the use of aggregated data for the purposes of this paper is discussed at length, as 
well as the reasons why we think that if aggregation introduces any bias on the estimated 
impact of marginal funding on performance, it is more likely to be an upward bias. 
FirstIy, it must be stressed that this paper does not attempt to as ses s treatment effec-
tiveness, i.e. whether treatment improves patients' condition, which, of course, requires a 
patient-Ievel analysis. Secondly, it does not attempt to determine which type of patients 
240ne exception to this rule is the "Harm-Reduction" movement in certain European countries (originated in 
The Netherlands and UK), which aims at decreasing the devastating consequences of substance abuse through, 
for instance, controlled consumption, needle sharing, or even liberalization of drugs, and not necessarily through 
the reduction of consumption and abstinence (see Marlatt, 1996). 
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are more cost-effective 25 but rather focuses on the performance of entire programs. This 
paper attempts to determine whether the marginal funding received by treatment agencies 
is being used to promote abstinence among their patients. This question legitimizes the use 
of aggregate data. 
Notice that although the purpose of this paper differs from treatment effectiveness eval-
uation, the two ideas are linked. Treatment effectiveness matters for our results in the sense 
that it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a positive impact of funding per patient 
on performance. An estimate of a that is not statistically significantly greater than zero is 
consistent with a situation where treatment is effective but funds are inefficiently allocated, 
as well as with a situation where treatment is not effective at the margino The idea is that 
even if treatment is effective there could still be waste caused by a misuse of public money, 
either because of abad allocation across agencies, or abad allocation across patients within 
an agency, or even because the state is overfunding treatment programs in general. 
This analysis is not able to determine the reason for the low value of a. The literature on 
substance abuse is, however, rich in studies of treatment effectiveness and overall, despite 
problems with many studies, has concluded that treatment is effective at least for sorne 
patients. A relevant study is Lu and Mcguire (1997). They use a patient-level dataset, also 
from outpatient programs in Maine, and ask whether more units of treatment lead to a 
reduction in the frequency of use of the preferred substance. Units of treatment can be 
regarded as an approximation to funds at the patient level, although one unit of treatment 
does not cost the same for all patients neither in the same programs nor across programs. 
They claim that there is sorne evidence of marginal treatment effectiveness for the more 
severe patients, although there is no marginal impact of treatment on the least severe. 
However, the positive effect on the more severe patients disappears when they control for 
the interaction of "units of treatment" with "time in treatment". 
This paper' s results in conjunction with the inconclusive results ofLu and McGuire raise a 
number of policy issues. In the first place, OSA should assess the added value (e.g. through a 
comprehensive cost -effectiveness study) of the outpatient drug-free treatment programs that 
it supports. Secondly, it should investigate whether agencies are implementing treatment 
adequately. And third, OSA should review and monitor agencies' expenditures to make 
sure that scarce public funds are not being devoted to x-inefficiencies. As an altemative 
to monitoring, OSA could minimize any waste by implementing incentives (such as PBC) 
more effectively. 
Regarding the possibility of aggregation bias, we will argue that if aggregation causes any 
bias on the estimate of a, it is more likely that it is an upward bias. An important reference 
is Hanushek et al. (1996) study of the impact of aggregation in the size of omitted variables 
biases. Although the authors caution about the lack of a clear prediction for most models, 
they show in a simple two-variable model that if the omitted variables are at the same level 
of aggregation as the data used (e.g. in our case program characteristics or average patient 
characteristics), aggregation will bias estimates upwards. Furthermore, they show evidence 
of this effect by comparing the estimated impact of school resources on school performance 
25 To study which patients are more cost-effective we would need reliable information on (at least) treatment costs 
at the patient leve!. Costs at the patient level can be computed from information reported in the MATS discharge 
forms. We have found, however, that these data are unreliable. 
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using both data aggregated at the state level and data disaggregated to the school level. 
Finally, they claim that it is plausible that missing state level variables are relevant for 
performance since "the key policies are made at the state level". 
In the case of outpatient treatment in Maine, it is also likely that the missing relevant 
variables are at the program level rather than at the patient level. As the more recent liter-
ature on treatment effectiveness has shown, programlagency characteristics (e.g. location, 
facility, staff, director, funding, staff enthusiasm and opinion about the program, treatment 
philosophy, etc.) are very important in explaining performance. An interesting example is 
Ball and Ross (1991) study of six methadone treatment programs. Furthermore, OSA is 
likely to observe these relevant programlagency variables and to take them into account 
in the allocation decisions, which is the potential source of omitted variable (endogeneity) 
bias. 
In addition to the arguments above, we can prove that in the context of our logistic 
"production function" without endogeneity, aggregation would, most likely, lead to an 
upward bias in the impact of funding on the average probability of success. 26 
Ultimately, we think that the concem with aggregation boils down to the estimation of 
an average marginal effect that may overshadow large individual marginal effects. In our 
results, however, the estimated marginal effect is so small that if large individual marginal 
effects exist it must be that programs are offering counterproductive treatment to a large 
proportion of the patient population, which is unlikely. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper estimates the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rates of 
non-profit outpatient treatment programs for alcohol abusers in the state of Maine, from 
1991 through 1994. The premise is that, given the scarcity of public funds, a marginal 
increase in the allocation of funds to these treatment programs should bring an increase in 
their performance; otherwise, the state would be better off by reallocating money to other 
state programs with positive marginal retums. 
This paper used an IV methodology to deal with the potential endogeneity of expenditures 
per patient. Endogeneity of expenditures is likely ifthe authorities use the funding allocation 
to compensate agencies for particularly hard situations, in which case programs that treat 
more difficult patients receive a larger allocation per patient. 
This paper' s results indicate that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on 
the abstinence rates of outpatient programs is not significantly different from zero. More 
importantly, the estimates are so small that we may say that they are not economically 
significant. To illustrate this point, take our most reliable and optimistic estimate of ex (a = 
0.0002) plus 2.5 times its standard error (i.e. a = 0.001331), this is the highest value of a 
that we are not able to reject at the 1 % confidence level. Next, suppose that all programs 
are equal to the average programo In this case, the representative program treats 79.76 
patients per period, discharges 38.5 patients at the end of the period, and, on average, has 
26 As an illustration, take programs 1 and 2: ajJ/ac = (a«p¡ + p2)/2)/a«c¡ + c2)/2)) = (ap¡/aC¡) + 
(ap2/aC2) =a¡p¡(1- p¡)+a2P2(1- P2) > max{a¡p¡(1- Pi), i = 1,2). 
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a probability of success equal to 0.72. With this set of values, the average cost of obtaining 
one more abstinent patient in the state ofMaine is US$ 615,801.80, which is substantially 
greater than the average accumulated expenditures per patient of US$ 1537.80. 27 
In conclusion, although the results are quite striking, we recommend further research to 
determine the use that treatment agencies are making of the public funds before deciding 
on a budget cut to alcohol abuse treatment programs, since it is possible that the marginal 
dollar is having a positive impact on other treatment goals that the state of Maine considers 
worthy of public funding. 
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